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The Criminalization of Maternal Substance Abuse:
A Quick Fix to a Complex Problem
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent South Carolina case has focused the public's attention on a
growing trend in criminal law-the imposition of criminal sanctions
against women whose drug abuse during pregnancy results in the irjury
or death of their fetuses or newborns. On July 15, 1996, in Vhitner v.
State, the South Carolina Supreme Court cleared the way for criminal
prosecution of mothers for abusive prenatal conduct that endangers the
fetus.' It was the first state high court in the nation to make such .a
declaration. In so ruling, the court reversed a lower court decision
which stated that a mother could not be found guilty of criminal child
neglect for causing her baby to be born with cocaine metabolites in its
system after she ingested crack cocaine during her third trimester of
pregnancy.' Writing for the majority, Justice Toal concluded that South
Carolina case law4 and the plain language of its child neglect statute'
clearly supported the charges of criminal child neglect in the case.' The
court also noted that the policy of the Children's Code, "the prevention
1. Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
2. See id.
3. See id. at *6.
4. See id. The Court pointed out that South Carolina law had long recognized
that viable fetuses are "persons holding certain legal rights." Id. at *2; see State v.
Home, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984) (stating that an action for homicide for the
killing of an unborn child may be maintained when it is proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that the fetus was viable at the time it was killed); Fowler v. Woodward, 138
S.E.2d 42, 43 (S.C. 1964) (stating that a complaint alleging that an infant who, while
in its eighth month of gestation, died when its mother died in an automobile collision
and related fire caused by the negligence and willful misconduct of the defendant
stated a valid cause of action for wrongful death of the child even though it failed to
allege that the child had been born alive and died thereafter); Hall v. Murphy, 113
S.E.2d 790, 793 (S.C. 1960) (stating that "a fetus having reached that period of prena-
tal maturity where it is capable of independent life apart from its mother is a person
and if such a child is injured, it may, after birth, maintain an action for such inju-
ries").
5. Under the statute, "child" is defined as a "person under the age of eighteen."
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-30(1) (Law Co-op. 1985).
6. See Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *2-3.
of children's problems," further supported its interpretation The
court stated:
The abuse or neglect of a child at any time during childhood can exact a profound
toll on the child herself as well as on society as a whole.
However, the consequences of abuse or neglect which takes place after birth
often pale in comparison to those resulting from abuse suffered by the viable
fetus before birth.'
It is easy to see how compassion and frustration might have influenced
the legal judgment of the three South Carolina justices in the three-to-
two Whitner decision.' It is estimated that between 350,000 and 739,200
infants are born each year exposed to drugs in utero.1° Fu thermore,
approximately 11% of all women have used illegal drugs while pregnant,
and of those 11%, 75% used cocaine during a pregnancy." Cocaine use
exposes individuals to such risks as prenatal strokes and seizures, pre-
mature birth, retarded fetal growth, and organ malformations. 2 The in-
7. See id. at *3. South Carolina Code section 20-7-20(C), which describes South
Carolina's policy concerning children, expressly states: "It shall be the policy of this
State to concentrate on the prevention of children's problems as the most important
strategy which can be planned and implemented on behalf of children and their fami-
lies." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-20(C) (Law Co-op 1985).
8. Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *3.
9. See id. Justice Toal delivered the opinion of the court. See id. at *1. Justices
Waller and Burnett concurred in the majority opinion which declared that the word
"child," as used in the child abuse and endangerment statute in the South Carolina
Children's Code, included viable fetuses. See id. at *7. Chief Justice Finney wrote a
separate dissenting opinion which contended that a reading of the entire child abuse
statute demonstrates that the General Assembly intended to criminalize only acts di-
rected at children, not fetuses. See id. at *8 (Finney, C.J., dissenting). Justice Moore
also wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that it is the province of the
General Assembly to criminalize the conduct at issue. See id. at *9 (Moore, J., dis-
senting).
10. See Deborah Rissing Baurac, Cocaine Babies: Researchers Optimistic About
Normal Childhoods, Cm. TPm., Mar. 7, 1993, at 11. Although such numbers denote
the severity of drug use during pregnancy, Dr. Ira Chasnoff and other researchers at
the National Association for Perinatal Addiction Research and Education in Chicago
found that early intervention can help some cocaine babies. See id. The babies in Dr.
Chasnoffs study who had been prenatally exposed to illicit drugs tended to have
lower intelligence test scores than peers who had not been exposed. See id. Addition-
ally, the study revealed that those drug-exposed babies that had early intervention to
help them focus their attention and control their behavior consistently scored higher
than drug-exposed children who did not receive those services. See id.
11. See Julia Elizabeth Jones, Comment, State Intervention in Pregnancy, 52 LA. L
REV. 1159, 1160 (1992).
12. See Ira J. Chasnoff et al., Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED.
665, 666-69 (1985); Helene M. Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-
Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior
by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2666 (1990) (explaining that infants who have
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creasing number of babies born with cocaine in their systems heightens
the frustration of the health care and legal communities in finding possi-
ble solutions to the problem. 3 A significant philosophical disagreement
exists, however, regarding the best way to respond to this complex so-
cial problem. 4
Opponents of intervention assert that criminal prosecution will do
more harm than good. 5 They maintain that if the legal system punishes
pregnant drug users, the fear of facing criminal charges will deter preg-
nant women from seeking prenatal care. 8 Women's rights advocates
assert that the most effective approach is to enable women to receive
prenatal care without the threat of criminal prosecution.'7 Additionally,
they argue that criminal or civil liability for prenatal conduct is a viola-
tion of a woman's right to bodily integrity and self-determination."
Proponents of criminal intervention focus on the issue of the culpabili-
ty of the pregnant woman." Regardless of whether or not criminal inter-
vention actually provides a deterrent, those favoring prosecution want to
been exposed to cocaine in utero have severe problems, such as rapid heart rates,
below average weight, and decreased immune systems).
13. This Comment addresses the issue of maternal substance abuse by focusing
primarily on cocaine, however the same arguments are applicable to other substances.
14. See Wendy Chavkin, Mandatory Treatment for Drug Use During Pregnancy,
266 JAMA 1556, 1556-57 (1991) (stating that political controversies such as the legal
status of the fetus and the criminalization of addiction have fueled the debate that is
usually polarized between therapy or sanction).
15. See Barbara Kantrowitz et al., The Pregnancy Police, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 29, 1991,
at 52. Women's organizations, such as the National Organization of Women (NOW),
have attacked legislation that regulates a pregnant woman's behavior. See id. NOW
considers such legislation the first step in creating a pregnancy-police state. See id.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argues that prosecution of pregnant wom-
en will not only fail to deter drug use during pregnancy, but will also create a prece-
dent for prosecuting a wide array of harmful prenatal conduct, such as maintaining
poor sleep habits, and failing to follow a doctor's orders. See id. at 53.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 52.
18. See generally Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's
Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN's LJ. 9 (1987).
19. For analysis in support of imposing criminal sanctions against pregnant drug
users, see Natasha C. LAsman, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy: A Case for State
Intervention to Protect Children from Prenatally Caused Harm, 34 BOsToN B.J. 26
(1990); Bonnie L Robin-Vergeer, The Problem of the Drug-Exposed Newborn: A Re-
turn to Principled Intervention, 42 STAN. L REV. 745 (1990); Rorie Sherman, Keeping
Baby Safe From Mom, 11 NAT'L LJ. 1 (1988).
hold the woman criminally liable for prenatal behavior that damages a
fetus.
20
This Comment challenges the current trend in criminalizing maternal
substance abuse in terms of both the nature of the problem and the
effectiveness of the solution. Part II discusses the historical development
of fetal rights and the ensuing impact on the privacy rights of pregnant
women.2' Part III examines the criminal statutes that prosecutors cur-
rently use to impose liability on drug-dependent mothers.' Additionally,
Part III examines the various reasons why prosecution does not effec-
tively solve the problem of maternal substance abuse.' Part IV address-
es the virtual absence of drug treatment programs available to pregnant
women.' Part IV also discusses the lack of child care available to these
women as they combat their drug addiction.25 Finally, this Comment
concludes that if the goal is to promote the birth of healthy children, the
imposition of criminal sanctions is the wrong approach because alterna-
tive strategies exist for decreasing fetal exposure to illicit drugs and for
strengthening the bond between a mother and child.2
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FETAL RIGHTS
The concept of fetal rights, the idea that a fetus has separate interests
that are equal to or even greater than those of a pregnant woman, has
had an interesting evolution. Historically, the fetus lacked rights as a
separate entity apart from the mother because the legal system treated
the fetus as part of the woman.27 In 1973, the Supreme Court declared
that a fetus is not a "person" for the purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's protection of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.' Conse-
20. See supra note 19.
21. See infra notes 27-111 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 112-54 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 155-87 and accompanying text.
24. See insfra notes 188-212 and accompanying text
25. See infra notes 213-20 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 221-36 and accompanying text.
27. See Dietrich v. Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884), overruled by Torrigan v.
Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967) (holding that a woman could not
recover for the death of her unborn child after an accident caused premature deliv-
ery); see also Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with
Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE
LJ. 599 (1986).
28. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). In Roe, the Supreme Court held
that a viable fetus is not a person, and thus cannot receive protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 158. The Court also held that the decision whether
or not to terminate a pregnancy falls within the constitutionally protected right of
privacy. See id. at 152-53.
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quently, the legal system remained hesitant to grant legal rights to the
fetus.2 The Supreme Court also recognized, however, that the state has
an interest in potential life that is to be weighed against the woman's
autonomy rights.'
In analyzing these competing interests, fetal rights advocates conclude
that the rights of the fetus should take precedence.3' Some courts have
endorsed this view by going so far as to order pregnant women to under-
go medical treatment, including surgery, against their will when the court
ascertains that the women's previous medical decisions were not made in
the best interest of the fetus.' In addition to ordering medical treat-
ment, courts directly intervene in the lives of pregnant women by allow-
ing hospitals to detain pregnant women who refuse medical treatment
for health conditions unrelated to pregnancy.' Fetal rights advocates
29. See id. at 161. The Roe Court afforded legal rights to fetuses in narrowly de-
fined situations and these rights were contingent upon a live birth requirement See
id. The live-birth requirement acknowledged the child's existence prior to birth as a
fetus in the mother's womb and was consistent with the concept that the fetus was
an extension of the woman. See id.
30. See id. at 162. According to the Supreme Court in Roe, two compelling state
interests justified limiting a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. See id. First,
the state has an interest in protecting women's health. See id. at 148-50, 163. Sec-
ond, the state has an interest in protecting potential human life. See id. at 150-51,
163-64. Under Roe, during the first trimester of pregnancy, the state's interests are
never compelling, and the state may not intervene in a woman's decision to abort.
See id. at 164. After the first trimester, the state has a compelling interest in wom-
en's health which it may protect by regulating abortion. See id. at 163 (reasoning
that a first-trimester abortion is safer than childbirth, but a second-trimester abortion
may be more dangerous than childbirth). At viability, which the Roe court deemed to
occur at the beginning of the third trimester, the state's interest in protecting hu-
man life becomes compelling, and the state may prohibit an abortion not necessary
to save the life or health of the woman. See id. at 162-64.
31. For a commentary supporting state intervention aimed at protecting the fetus,
see Sam S. Balisy, Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Pro-
tection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL L. REV. 1209, 1234-38 (1987) (balancing the interests
of the mother and the fetus and determining that the state's primary responsibility
is owed to the fetus); see also Judith Kahn, Note, Of Woman's First Disobedience:
Forsaking a Duty of Care to Her Fetus-Is This a Mother's Crime?, 53 BRoOK. L
REV. 807, 842-43 (1987) (recognizing a need to balance a pregnant woman's funda-
mental privacy rights with the state's duty to protect the fetus).
32. See Veronika E.B. Holder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1194-96 (1987); see also Nancy K Rhoden, The Judge in the
Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL L REV. 1951,
1960-63 (1986).
33. See Holder et al., supra note 32, at 1194-96 (commenting on the judicial inter-
assert that children should be able to bring legal claims against their
mothers for "prenatal irtjuries." In some industries, employers have
adopted "fetal protection" policies which bar fertile women of childbear-
ing age from certain high-paying, unionized jobs. 5
A. Traditional Fetal Interests
Historically, an unborn child was legally inseparable from the mother,
and state common law afforded a child no legal protection prior to
birth.' There are two frequently offered explanations for the live-birth
requirement. First, fetuses are separate from the mother only after birth,
and therefore, only require protection of the law after birth.3' Second,
traditionally, it was medically impossible for a fetus to survive outside of
the mother's womb.' Due to advances in medical technology and a
retreat in the line of viability,' a determined movement for recognition
of fetal rights began.' This movement seeks to define the fetus as a per-
son and to hold the woman legally liable for the fetus's well-being.4' Ad-
est of protecting the fetus).
34. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L REv. 405, 441 (1983) (maintaining that because
the doctrine of parental immunity is eroding, it is consistent to allow a child to sue
its mother for prenatally sustained injuries). But cf. Stailman v. Youngquist, 531
N.E.2d 355, 360 (111. 1988) (stating that a child cannot maintain a lawsuit against its
mother for unintentional infliction of injuries suffered while in the womb).
35. See generally Wendy W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The
Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title
VII, 69 Gso. L.J. 641 (1981) (discussing Title VII and how to fashion a fetal protec-
tion employment policy which is consistent with the goals of Title VII). See, e.g.,
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) (holding that a
fetal protection policy violated Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination).
36. See Patricia A. King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal
Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L REv. 1647, 1657 (1979) (noting that live-birth
provided an "adequate and uncomplicated standard").
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See Charles Marwick, Coming to Terms With Indications for Fetal Surgeries,
270 JAMA 2025, 2026-27 (1993) (stating that recent remarkable advances in medical
technology have made the United States the leader in diagnostic, medical, and surgi-
cal intervention in the treatment of infants in utero); see also George J. Annas, The
Impact of Medical Technology on the Pregnant Woman's Right to Privacy, 13 AM.
J.L & MED. 213, 213-32 (1989) (stating that diagnostic tools such as ultrasonography,
amniocentesis, or chronic villus sampling can be used to detect fetal abnormalities
that, in some cases, may be treated through prenatal therapy or fetal surgery).
40. See Johnsen, supra note 27, at 605 (commenting that the fetus has been con-
ceptualized as an entity independent of the woman).
41. For analysis opposing the expansion of fetal rights, see Robert Holland, Crimi-
nal Sanctions for Drug Abuse During Pregnancy: The Antithesis of Fetal Health, 8
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vocates of fetal protection have succeeded in gaining greater protection
of the fetus in various areas of the law.' The reason for the expansion
stems from the fact that some courts are more willing to recognize the
fetus in a context not contingent upon live birth.'
1. Inheritance and Trust Law
The common law has been slow to recognize the rights of an unborn
child.' It was only under the laws of inheritance that an unborn child
was first recognized as a "person" entitled to legal protection.45 Al-
though the right to inherit property is not "perfected" until there is a live
birth, inheritance laws recognize that an unborn child is capable of ac-
quiring property interests.' Under these laws, live-born children qualify
for their inheritance share, even if they were only in utero at the time of
the testator's death.47 Similarly, in trust law, a beneficiary need only be
ascertainable within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities." It is
not necessary that the beneficiary be alive or even known at the time the
trust is created.49 Additionally, to protect the unborn beneficiary's in-
terest in the trust, the guardian may bring suit on behalf of the unborn
child.'°
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 415 (1991); Nancy K Schiff, Note, Legislation Punishing
Drug Use During Pregnancy: Attack on Women's Rights in the Name of Fetal Pro-
tection, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 197 (1991).
42. See David H. Montague & Sharon McLaughlin, Drug Exposed Infants: En
Ventre Sa Mere-and in Need of Protection, 44 BAYLOR L REV. 485, 490-97 (1992)
(stating that fetal protection has evolved over the years in the areas of inheritance,
tort, and criminal law).
43. See Johnsen, supra note 27, at 600-04 (discussing the live-birth requirement for
acquisition of legal rights and the subsequent development of fetal rights).
44. See Molly McNulty, Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Im-
plications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV.
L & Soc. CHANGE 277, 279 (1988) (commenting that any assertable interest in the
fetus is a recent development).
45. See Johnsen, supra note 27, at 601-02.
46. See Jeffrey A. Parness & Susan K Pritchard, To Be or Not To Be: Protecting
the Unborn's Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L REV. 257, 264-65; see also Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161 (1973).
47. See McNulty, supra note 44, at 279 n.8 (noting that protecting the inheritance
rights of the fetus was the exception rather than the rule).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 112 (1957).
49. See id. cmt. a.
50. See id. § 214 cmt. a.
2. Tort Law
Despite an early recognition of fetal rights in property law, legal recog-
nition of the fetus in tort law is a more modem development. Tort claims
for prenatal injuries emerged as medical technology improved and it
became possible for a fetus to survive outside the mother's womb at an
earlier stage of development.51 Today, all American jurisdictions allow a
fetus, subsequently born alive, to bring a tort cause of action against a
third party for prenatal injuries. 2 Additionally, most jurisdictions extend
the rights of the fetus under tort law to include a right of recovery under
a wrongful death claim if the fetus was viable and would have had stand-
ing to maintain an action for personal injuries had it lived.' Although a
few jurisdictions allow recovery for all injuries sustained from the time
of conception as long as the child is later born alive,' most states limit
recovery to injuries sustained after the point of viability.'
The vast majority of prenatal tort cases involve third-party liability.
While some courts impose third-party liability, most remain reluctant to
extend prenatal tort liability to women who tortiously ijure their fetus-
es.' However, some legal scholars advocate the extension of prenatal
tort liability in the area of maternal substance abuse.57 The two reported
51. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D.D.C. 1946). This was the first
case to extend tort protection to viable fetuses, and to reject the common law view
that a fetus is so intimately united with its mother that it is a part of her. See id.
For a more in-depth discussion of this case, see McNulty, supra note 44, at 280-82.
52. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55,
at 368 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that in every jurisdiction, children born alive are per-
mitted to maintain causes of action for consequences of prenatal injuries).
53. See King, supra note 36, at 1662-63 nn.70-74; see also Hernandez v. Garwook,
390 So. 2d 357, 359 (Fla. 1980) (holding that no cause of action was established
under the Wrongful Death Act for the death of a stillborn child); Raymond v.
Bartsch, 447 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (holding that a mother could not
recover for the loss of a fetus as the result of an auto accident).
54. See Ron Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liabili-
ty for Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L REv. 325, 357-69
(1984).
55. See Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 365 S.E.2d 909, 912
(N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that parents had a claim for wrongful death of their
stillborn child, however, recovery was limited to cases where the fetus was viable).
But see Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (N.J. 1960) (stating that there is no
reason for denying recovery for prenatal injury because it occurred before the infant
was capable of a separate existence).
56. See Balisy, supra note 31, at 1236-37 (recommending the adoption of prenatal
tort liability); see also Sandra A. Garcia, Drug Addiction and Mother/Child WefVare,
13 J. LEG. MED. 129, 141 (1992) (noting that advocates of maternal, prenatal tort
liability must address several complicated issues).
57. See Balisy, supra note 31; see also Garcia, supra note 56.
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cases that addressed the issue came to different results. In the frequently
cited case of Grodin v. Grodin,' the Michigan Court of Appeals held a
mother of a child, whose teeth were discolored due to her prenatal use
of tetracycline, to the same standard as a third-party tortfeasor, allowing
the child to recover damages if the mother's conduct was found to be
unreasonable.' For the most part, other jurisdictions take a different
position than that stated by the Grodin court. In Stallman v.
Youngquist,6 the Illinois Supreme Court declined to follow Grodin, and
held that a child could not assert a cause of action against her mother
when her mother's negligent driving resulted in prenatal injury. Al-
though an Illinois appellate court previously allowed a child to recover
against its mother following Grodin, the Illinois Supreme Court overruled
the decision, emphasizing that "[a] legal duty to guarantee the mental and
physical health of another has never before been recognized in law." 2
The court reasoned that allowing the child to recover is akin to treating
the mother as a stranger to her fetus, thereby creating an adversarial
relationship between mother and child.' Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the best way to ensure healthy babies is not the imposition
of tort liability, but "before-the-fact education of all women and families
about prenatal development."'
3. Criminal Law
Criminal law provides little recognition to fetal rights. Unlike tort law,
criminal law is almost exclusively statutory.' The Model Penal Code,
which serves as the model for the criminal statutes in most states, de-
fines a "human being" as "a person who has been born and who is
alive." ' Therefore, the criminal statutes of many states do not recognize
58. 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
59. See id. at 870-71 (reasoning that the mother would bear the same liability for
negligent conduct as would a third person).
60. 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988).
61. See id. at 355.
62. Id. at 359.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 361.
65. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOWr, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1, at 66 (2d ed. 1986).
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0(1) (1985). At common law, the definition of "per-
son" for the purposes of criminal law was one who had been "born alive." See
LAFAVE & ScowT, supra note 65. The Model Penal Code simply incorporated the com-
mon law definition into its statute. See id.
the fetus as a protected class. The few exceptions to this are narrowly
construed. For example, in 1970 the California Supreme Court refused to
interpret the state's homicide statute to include a fetus within the term
"human being.""7 As a result, the California legislature amended the stat-
ute to expressly expand the definition of murder to include "the unlawful
killing of a human being or fetus."'
Feticide statutes, which make the destruction of a fetus a crime paral-
lel to homicide, recognize the right of the fetus to be protected from
certain conduct.' Such statutes, however, are not adopted in most
states.'0 Jurisdictions adopting these statutes narrowly construe them,
effectively excluding maternal conduct resulting in the fetus's death.7'
Furthermore, most states have refused to expand protection of the fetus
under other criminal statutes.' This is a result of the courts' general
unwillingness to extend existing statutes beyond their intended purpos-
es.
73
Nationwide, the trend is for state prosecutors to attempt to prosecute
women for "fetal abuse" under a variety of criminal statutes. Dismissal
of such charges by appellate courts is prevalent, but in a breakthrough
ruling in July 1996, the South Carolina Supreme Court became the first
appellate court to uphold a woman's conviction for endangering the
health of her unborn child.7' By using criminal statutes that were not
intended to be applied to this type of maternal conduct, state prosecu-
67. See Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (holding that an unborn,
viable fetus was not a human being under California Penal Code section 187).
68. See CAL PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1996); King, supra note 36, at 1663.
69. See, e.g., 38 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 9/1-2 (West 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7
(West 1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 585.13 (1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201
(1990); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (West 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04
(West 1982).
70. See Michael A. Shekey, Comment, Criminal Liability of a Prospective Mother
for Prenatal Neglect of a Viable Fetus, 9 WHrnER L. REv. 363, 375 n.105 (1987) (not-
ing that while five other states adopted special feticide statutes between 1830 and
1850, California did not); Elizabeth L Thompson, Note, The Criminalization of Ma-
ternal Conduct During Pregnancy: A Decisionmaking Model for Law Makers, 64 IND.
U. 357, 360-61 nn.26-36.
71. See Shekey, supra note 70, at 380-91; Thompson, supra note 70, at 361 & n.34.
72. See Shekey, supra note 70, at 380-91.
73. See id.
74. State prosecutors are using criminal statutes relating to abuse and neglect, in-
cluding child endangerment and aggravated child abuse, delivery or distribution of
controlled substances to minors, and involuntary manslaughter. See infra notes 112-54
and accompanying text.
75. See Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164 (S.C. July 15, 1996) (holding
that a mother may be criminally prosecuted for child abuse for prenatal conduct that
endangers her fetus).
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tors and some courts have ignored the legislative purpose behind these
statutes and, in the process, have usurped the legislature's power to
define what type of conduct should be criminalized.6 As a result, crimi-
nal statutes have been misused, legislative intent has been disregarded,
and judicial power and discretion have been abused. While early fetal
laws primarily protected the fetus from third parties, 7 recent ones, it
has been argued, "set mother and fetus against each other."'8
B. Conflict and the Constitution
As courts increase their recognition of the fetus as an individual, the
potential for the imposition of criminal sanctions against women whose
conduct during pregnancy results in injury or death of their fetuses in-
creases. Accordingly, it is important to consider the serious constitution-
al concerns criminal charges based on prenatal conduct raise.
1. Due Process Concerns
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment substantially
guarantees a fundamental right of privacy to all citizens of the United
States.' The fundamental requirements of procedural due process are
the "opportunity to be heard, to be aware that a matter is pending, to
make an informed choice whether to acquiesce or contest and to assert
before the appropriate decision-making body the reasons for such
76. See infrs notes 117-18, 134 and accompanying text.
77. See SUSAN FALUD, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN
423 (1991). Early fetal laws contemplated the conviction of third parties such as
drunk drivers and those guilty of accosting a pregnant woman. See id.
78. Id. at 424-25. Fetal laws were used by prosecutors, physicians, and husbands
to haul women into court. See id. Pregnant women's blood was tested for drugs
without their consent or notification. See id. Confidentiality rights were violated so
that the state could gather information against pregnant women. See id.; see also Paul
Marcotte, Crime and. Pregnancy: Prosecutors, New Drug Laws, Torts Pit Mom
Against Baby, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1989, at 14 (analyzing how the expansion of fetal rights
places the mother and fetus in opposing positions); Doretta M. McGinnis, Comment,
Prosecution of Mothers of Drug-Exposed Babies: Constitutional and Criminal Theory,
139 U. PA. L REV. 505, 505-07 (1990) (discussing prosecution of women who used
drugs during pregnancy during the late 1980s).
79. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that a state criminal abor-
tion law that exempted from criminality only a life-saving procedure on the mother's
behalf without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and other interests involved vio-
lated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
choice."' Due process prohibits prosecutors and courts from interpret-
ing or applying an existing law in an unforeseeable or unintended man-
ner.81
A number of courts have determined that the unprecedented applica-
tion of statutes, such as child abuse provisions, to prenatal conduct vio-
lates due process guarantees because women were not provided the
required notice that such laws applied to fetuses or prenatal conduct.'
Other courts have recognized that interpreting a child abuse statute to
include prenatal conduct renders the measure unconstitutionally vague
because women would not know what behavior would be criminal. 3
Due to the various types of activities that can be considered harmful to
the fetus, one appellate court stated that "[allowing the state to define
the crime of child abuse according to the health or condition of the new-
born child would subject many mothers to criminal liability for engaging
in all sorts of legal or illegal activities during pregnancy.'
2. The Right of Privacy
Prosecution of women for their behavior during pregnancy also impli-
cates the right of privacy. The Supreme Court first acknowledged a priva-
cy right in Griswold v. Connecticut," in which the Court declared un-
constitutional a statute prohibiting married couples from using contra-
80. Trinity Episcopal Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044, 1084 (1974) (finding that
a municipality's full public hearings on conversion of two land sites provided ade-
quate opportunities for plaintiffs to express their opposition to the proposed conver-
sion) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 336 (1950);
Giannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)); see also Vaughn v. State, 456 S.W.2d
879, 883 (Ala. Crim. App. 1970) (stating that, aside from all else, due process means
fundamental fairness and substantial justice).
81. See Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 432 (1973) (stating that the unforeseeable
application of a traffic law deprived petitioners of due process); Boue v. City of Co-
lumbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964) (stating that the deprivation of the right of a fair
warning can result from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of nar-
row and precise statutory language).
82. See, e.g., People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843, 847 (1992) (holding that a
mother's alleged ingestion of cocaine while pregnant did not endanger the welfare of
a "child" because holding otherwise would violate her right to due process under
federal and state constitutions).
83. See, e.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 736 (Ariz. 1995) (holding
that interpreting a state statute that criminalized an act injuring a child as applying
to a pregnant woman's heroin usage during pregnancy which resulted in an addicted
newborn would "offend due process notions of fundamental fairness and render the
statute impermissibly vague").
84. Id. at 736-37.
85. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ception.' The Court reasoned that certain personal decisions deserved
constitutional protection through the right of privacy. 7
Building on Griswold, later cases reinforced this privacy right as the
right to be free from state interference in making decisions within the
familial and procreative spheres.' The right of procreational freedom
was extended by Eisenstadt v. Baird' to include unmarried persons.'
In Eisenstadt, the Court concluded that "[ijf the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."9
Additionally, the Griswold Court stated that a "'governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.'"92 Accordingly,
Griswold and its progeny suggest that the state cannot implement regula-
tions that unnecessarily invade the "'area of protected freedoms.'"'
With promotion of individual rights as the cornerstone of the American
legal system, state intervention during pregnancy is troubling. 4 The law
clearly recognizes that pregnant women have individual rights deserving
of constitutional protection.' Such rights include the right to reproduc-
86. See id. at 485.
87. See id. at 485-86.
88. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1977) (striking down
an ordinance that restricted the ability of certain relatives to live together); see also
Developments in the Law--The Constitution and the Family, 93 HAiv. L REV. 1156,
1351-57 (1980).
89. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute which
banned the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons).
90. See id. at 453.
91. Id.
92. 381 U.S. at 485 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
93. See id. (quoting NAACP, 377 U.S. at 307 (1964)).
94. See MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALYC THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLcAL DIs-
COURSE 40-41 (1991) (discussing the American tendency to define rights in absolute
terms and how the right of privacy model has steadily replaced the property rights
model as the basis of law).
95. For a more in-depth analysis of the constitutional issues involved, see
Gallagher, supra note 18; Johnsen, supra note 27; Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal
Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse," 101 HARv. L REV.
994 (1988) [hereinafter Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs]; Note, Rethinking
(M)otherhod: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L REV.
1325 (1990).
tive and familial privacy,' the right to bodily integrity,'7 and the right
to equal protection under the law.' The fear is that legal recognition of
the fetus as an independent person prior to birth will undermine a key
holding of Roe v. Wade.' Such a view, it is argued, leads to a lack of
respect for a woman's autonomy.'0°
3. The Significance of Roe v. Wade
Constitutional analysis which balances the rights of the pregnant wom-
an against the state's interest in protecting the fetus places the rights of
the mother in direct conflict with the interests of the fetus. 101 Fetal
rights advocates assume that the rights of the fetus should prevail over
the rights of the pregnant woman. Currently, the law fails to recognize
any constitutional right to life on the part of the fetus." 2 In fact, the Su-
96. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (holding that the
state may not "unduly burden" a woman's right to choose to abort a fetus before
viability); see also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 (19T1) (strildng
down zoning ordinances that impaired the ability of families to live together).
97. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (holding that compelling a woman to carry a
pregnancy to term infringes upon her right to bodily integrity by imposing physical
demands, invasions, and health risks); see also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767
(1985) (invalidating a court order for the surgical removal of a bullet from a murder
suspect under the theory of bodily integrity); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952) (finding mandatory stomach pumping unconstitutional because die right of
bodily integrity outweighs the state's interest in procuring evidence for criminal
prosecution).
98. See Wengler v. Druggist Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 147-48 (1980) (striking
down a state statute that paid workers' compensation benefits to widows of deceased
workers but denied benefits to widowers).
99. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (holding that Texas criminal abortion statutes which
prohibited abortions at any stage of pregnancy except to save the life of the mother
were unconstitutional). The Roe Court concluded that 'the word 'person,' as used in
the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn." Id. at 158.
100. See Aaron Epstein, Medicine Changing Legal View of Fetuses, NEWS & OBSERV-
ER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 4, 1996, at A23.
101. See Cynthia Gorney, Whose Body Is It Anyway? The Legal Maelstrom That
Rages When the Rights of Mother and Fetus Collide, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1988, at
D2 (criticizing the emphasis of fetal rights over maternal rights in criminal law be-
cause it pits the mother against the fetus as adversaries and fails to solve the prob-
lems related to fetal cocaine exposure).
102. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (denying fetal rights); see also Julie N. Qureshi, Note,
People v. Davis: California's Murder Statute and the Requirement of Viability for
Fetal Murder, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L REv. 579, 588 (1995) (stating that the use of
separate feticide statutes instead of general murder statutes removes the explosive
viability issue from the argument over whether the state has a perpetual interest in
the potential life when the fetus is being abused by the mother's negligence.). The
state draws a distinction as to when it can intervene, between harming a fetus a
mother intends to birth and terminating a pregnancy as a legal, conscious choice. See
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preme Court held in Roe v. Wade that the fetus is not a person under the
Fourteenth Amendment and is thus not entitled to the constitutional
protection it provides."° However, Roe did recognize a state interest in
protecting potential life."° Furthermore, since Roe, the Supreme Court
increased the state interest in protecting the fetus and gave the state
more authority to intervene during pregnancy. 5
While it is true that Roe acknowledged the state's compelling interest
in the fetus at viability, the Court placed a limit on the exercise of this
interest by expressly permitting a woman to obtain an abortion even
after fetal viability if "it is necessary to preserve [her] life or health.""°
Additionally, the state may not adopt post-viability abortion regulations
that trade off risks to the health of the pregnant woman against benefits
to the health of her fetus.'" It is incorrect to assert that Roe grants the
state unrestricted authority to protect the fetus or to prohibit abortions
after viability.
State intervention during pregnancy is constitutional where the state
interest in protecting the fetus outweighs the constitutional rights of the
pregnant woman. "  If there is substantial evidence that prenatal drug
use causes severe and lasting harm to a child, the state still must demon-
strate that the chosen form of intervention is reasonably likely to prevent
id.
103. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. But see Cole, supra note 12, at 2664 (commenting
that a pregnant woman owes a greater responsibility to her fetus than one individual
owes to another). See generally Christina L. Misner, What if Mary Sue Wanted an
Abortion Instead? The Effect of Davis v. Davis on Abortion Rights, 3 AM. U. J. GEN-
DER & L 265, 287 (1995) (stressing that the fetus is in an unusual position because it
is not given the rights of a living human, but it is more than a non-sentient grouping
of cells).
104. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
105. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-73 (1992) (holding that
states may intervene "[e]ven in the earliest stages of pregnancy" as long as such
intervention does not impose an "undue burden" on a woman's ability to decide
whether to terminate the pregnancy); see also Bicka A. Barlow, Comment, Severe
Penalties for the Destruction of "Potential Lfe"--Cruel and Unusual Punishment?,
29 U.S.F. L REv. 463, 469 (1995) (arguing that if the privacy rights of the mother are
not implicated, then the state's interest in the well-being of the fetus can prevail).
106. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64.
107. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 769 (1986); see also Annas, supra note 39, at 213-32 (stating that forcing a
pregnant woman to accept an invasive procedure or to undertake a health risk
against her will burdens her decision to have a child).
108. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64 (creating a trimester system).
or alleviate the harm. ° Criminalizing maternal substance abuse does
not provide the least restrictive means that the constitutional standard
demands.1 Alternatives such as education, drug treatment programs,
and prenatal care can achieve more successful results for the fetus and,
at the same time, be less invasive to a woman's autonomy rights."'
M. CRIMINALIZING MATERNAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE
A. Types of Statutes Being Used to Prosecute Women
Criminal statutes used to prosecute women for conduct that results in
the injury or death of their fetuses or newborns include various types of
statutes relating to child abuse and neglect,"' delivery or distribution of
controlled substances to minors,"3 and involuntary manslaughter."'
Many of these charges are based on the assumption that fetuses are legal
persons, and all implicitly hold women criminally liable for their prenatal
conduct."' By invoking criminal sanctions in this context, society di-
rectly punishes women for their behavior during pregnancy.
6
State prosecutors choose different avenues of prosecution for a num-
ber of reasons. The most obvious reason is the complete absence of
criminal statutes that directly proscribe maternal conduct that causes
109. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1974) (holding
that mandatory termination provisions of maternity rules violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 480 (1960)
(holding invalid a state statute requiring teachers to file affidavits listing all affilia-
tions as a condition of employment).
110. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (noting that in cases involving fundamental rights,
"legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate interest
at stake").
111. See Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 95, at 995-1012 (discussing
the constitutionality of criminal liability for maternal harm to a fetus).
112. For example, charges have been filed under criminal child abuse and neglect
statutes in California, Florida, Connecticut, Michigan, Ohio, Arizona, Colorado, Indiana
and South Carolina. See infra notes 119-34 and accompanying text.
113. For example, charges have been filed under delivery or distribution statutes in
Illinois, South Carolina, Colorado, Florida and Michigan. See infra notes 135-50 and
accompanying text.
114. To date, the only charge of involuntary manslaughter was brought in Rockford,
Illinois. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text
115. See supra notes 108-14 and infra notes 116-19, 123-24 and accompanying text.
116. The Uniform Act states that the mere condition of alcoholism is not criminal
conduct See UNIF. ALCOHOL AND INTOXICATION TREATmENT AcT, § 1.19, 9(1) U.L.A. 104-
05 (1988). Similarly, a state may not criminalize the condition of drug addiction. See,
e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding a state law requiring
narcotic addiction to be punished by imprisonment cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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prenatal injuries to the fetus."7 It is worth noting that in states where
pregnant substance abusers are charged with child abuse or neglect, no
legislature has specified that a woman's prenatal use of drugs should be
included in these statutes. This is most likely due to the fact that right to
privacy arguments would deem such statutes unconstitutional."8
1. Child Abuse Statutes
Prosecutions of pregnant women who use drugs center on child abuse
or neglect."9 At first glance, child abuse statutes appear to directly ad-
dress the type of conduct that state prosecutors attempt to criminalize.
Upon closer inspection, however, the majority of these statutes do not
expressly protect the fetus.'20 Therefore, to convict a woman under a
child abuse statute, the court must extend the definition of "child" to in-
clude a fetus. 2 ' Even if the statute expressly protects "those conceived
but not yet born," there must be evidence of legislative intent for the
statute to apply to the mother's conduct."
In California v. Stewart the state sought to prosecute Pamela Stewart
for prenatal conduct which subsequently led to the death of her
child.'" A California child support statute was the basis for charges
brought against Stewart," who failed to follow her doctor's orders
while pregnant.'25 The California Municipal Court of San Diego found
117. See Gallagher, supra note 18, at 40-41 (commenting that Roe's observation
that United States law has never treated the unborn as persons in the legal sense
remains true today).
118. For a discussion of the right to privacy issues inherent in fetal rights cases,
see supra notes 85-100 and accompanying text
119. See Kristen Barrett, Note, Prosecuting Pregnant Addicts for Dealing to the Un-
born, 33 ARIz. L. REv. 221, 229 (1991).
120. See Kantrowitz et al., Cocaine Babies: The Littlest Victims, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 2,
1989, at 55.
121. See id.
122. See Marcia Chambers, Charges Against Mother of Baby are Thrown Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1987, at A25 (stating that the legislative purpose behind California
Penal Code section 270 was to provide financial support for children, and that the
inclusion of the fetus was simply an expansion of the class of people whose financial
security would be protected).
123. No. M508197, slip op. at 1-11 (San Diego Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987).
124. See id. at 7; Marcia Chambers, Dead Baby's Mother Faces Criminal Charge
on Acts in Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1986, at A22.
125. See Stewart, No. M508197, slip op. at 1-11. Stewart's obstetrician advised her
to stay off her feet, refrain from sex, and go to the hospital if she started to bleed.
that the child neglect statute was not intended to create criminal liability
for maternal conduct that causes prenatal injury.'26 Instead, the court
concluded that the legislative history clearly indicated that the statute
only was intended to compel parents to financially support their children,
not to prosecute women for conduct that causes injury to the fetus.12 1
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the statute's original pur-
pose: to provide a woman financial support if the father of the child de-
serted her while she was pregnant, and to ensure that the woman had
sufficient funds available for prenatal care and other medical expenses
resulting from her pregnancy." The court concluded that prosecuting
Pamela Stewart under this statute was a clear abuse of discretion.I2
Where criminal abuse and neglect statutes do not specifically extend
protection to unborn children, most courts will refuse to imply that child
neglect statutes are designed to protect the fetus."w In Reyes v. Superi-
or Court,3' the California Court of Appeal held that the state's felony
child endangerment statute was not an appropriate basis for a criminal
conviction for maternal conduct that caused prenatal injuries because
the statute did not expressly refer to an unborn child or fetus."3 Ac-
See id.
126. See id. at 7-10. The statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to furnish
necessary ... medical attendance, or other remedial care for his or her
child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine .... A
child conceived but not yet born is to be deemed an existing person insofar
as this section is concerned.
CAL PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988).
127. See Stewart, No. M508197, slip op. at 8-9.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 10.
130. See id.; see also Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 735 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1995) (stating that defendant could not be prosecuted under a child abuse statute for
prenatal conduct that caused harm to the child after birth); State v. Gethers, 585 So.
2d 1140, 1142 (Fla. 1991) (stating that because a child abuse statute did not reach an
unborn fetus, defendant could not be prosecuted for child abuse based upon the
introduction of cocaine into her body during the gestation period of her unborn
child). But see In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ohio 1986) (stating that a child
whose mother admitted using heroin intravenously at least two weeks prior to the
child's delivery, and who was born addicted to heroin, was abused by the mother
within the meaning of a statute prohibiting a parent from creating substantial risk to
the health or safety of its child); Collins v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893, 898 (Tex. App.
1994) (stating that a mother could not be prosecuted under an injury to child statute
for ingesting cocaine while pregnant even if it causes the fetus to suffer pain or to
be impaired).
131. 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct. App. 1977).
132. See id. at 912-15. The court stated that "we are persuaded that the word
,child' as used in Penal Code section 273a(1) was not intended to refer to an un-
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cordingly, charges brought under the statute against a mother, whose
heroin use during pregnancy led to the birth of twins addicted to heroin,
were not allowed.Y The court concluded that the statute does not ap-
ply to conduct that causes injury to a fetus because the legislature chose
not to clearly and expressly include protection of the fetus within the
scope of the statute."3
2. Controlled Substance Statutes
Women also face charges under various controlled substance stat-
utes."n The most commonly used drug statute is delivery or distribution
of an unlawful substance to a minor."' This type of statute was the
basis for the first criminal conviction of a mother for conduct that
caused prenatal injuries.31 On July 13, 1989, a Florida judge convicted
Jennifer Clarise Johnson for delivering illegal drugs to her fetus through
the umbilical cord." Johnson was prosecuted after going to the hospi-
tal for treatment and honestly disclosing her drug use. This conviction
marked the first time that a statute, normally used to convict drug deal-
ers, was applied successfully in this context.Y Because fetuses are not
considered "persons" under Florida law, the prosecutor needed to prove
that Johnson "pumped" or delivered cocaine into her child during the
sixty-second period after birth and prior to the cutting of the umbilical
cord."4
born child and that the petitioner's prenatal conduct does not constitute felonious
child endangering within contemplation of the statute." Id. at 913. The court further
concluded that section 273a(1) "was not intended to be applicable to prenatal con-
duct" Id.
133. See id. at 913, 915.
134. See id. at 915. The court concluded that "[h]ad the Legislature meant to in-
clude unborn children among the class of victims described in Penal Code section
273a(1), it could easily have so provided by amending the statute . . . . " Id.
135. States that have attempted to or currently are charging women under con-
trolled substance statutes include Florida, Illinois, Colorado, South Carolina, Michigan,
and Indiana. See Catherine Foster, Fetal Endangerment Cases Increase, CHJSTAN SCI.
MoNrrOR, Oct. 10, 1989, at 8.
136. See id.
137. See id.; Florida v. Johnson, No. E89-890-C8A, (Seminole County Ct. July 13,
1989).
138. See Johnson, No. E89-890C8A, sentencing order at 1.
139. See id. Johnson was convicted for delivering drugs to a minor under Florida
law. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(1)(c)1 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996).
140. See Eileen McNamara, Fetal Endangerment Cases on the Rise, BOSTON GLOBE,
In 1991, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed Johnson's con-
viction.' For purposes of the Florida statute, the court held that a
child is a person after birth, but not before the umbilical cord is sev-
ered.' The court stated that since Ms. Johnson chose to use cocaine,
become pregnant, and bring the pregnancy to full term, she was criminal-
ly responsible for her actions."
The Supreme Court of Florida overturned Ms. Johnson's conviction in
July 1992." The court ruled that cocaine passing through an umbilical
cord after birth, but before cutting the cord, did not violate the Florida
statute prohibiting adult delivery of an illegal substance to a minor."
The court based its decision on the legislative history of the statute."
The history reveals no intent to use the word "delivery" in the context of
criminally prosecuting mothers for delivery of a controlled substance by
way of the umbilical cord."'7 Similarly, in People v. Hardy,"' where
the state tried to convict Kimberly Hardy for delivering cocaine to her
newborn in the minute before the doctors severed the umbilical cord,"9
the court held the conduct did not violate the delivery of controlled sub-
stances statute."n
3. Involuntary Manslaughter
In 1989, in the most dramatic and serious maternal substance abuse
charge to date, state prosecutors in Rockford, Illinois charged Melanie
Green with involuntary manslaughter and delivery of a controlled sub-
stance after her two-day-old daughter died.'5' Both mother and infant
Oct. 3, 1989, at 1. Johnson admitted to using cocaine the night before delivery with
her first child and during active labor with her second. See Johnson, No. E89-890-
C8A, sentencing order at 1.
141. See Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
142. See id. at 419; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(1)(c) (West 1994) (stating that
"[elxcept as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to sell or deliv-
er a controlled substance in or within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising
a ... school .... ).
143. See Johnson, 578 So. 2d at 420.
144. See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
145. See id. at 1292.
146. See id. at 1292-93.
147. See id.
148. 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. 1991).
149. See id. at 51-52.
150. See id. at 53.
151. See Mother Charged After Her Baby Dies of Cocaine, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
1989, at A18 [hereinafter Mother Charged]. Green was charged under Illinois law. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-3 (1988).
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tested positive for cocaine.'52 The prosecutor alleged that Green's co-
caine use during pregnancy was reckless and showed disregard for her
child's life.'" Charges were later dropped when the county grand jury
refused to indict Green on the ground that the legislature did not intend
for the manslaughter statute to impose criminal liability on women for
the death of a fetus."M
B. The Ineffectiveness of Prosecution
Although appellate courts systematically overturn criminal convictions
of pregnant drug users, zealous prosecutors continue to pursue these
women, turning the war on drugs into a war on women. The state faces
several problems if it chooses to enact a new statute specifically
criminalizing substance abuse during pregnancy or to prosecute pregnant
substance abusers under existing criminal statutes. First, the traditional
rationales for criminal liability do not justify prosecuting pregnant sub-
stance abusers."w Second, by bringing a criminal prosecution against
the mother, the state adopts an adversarial approach, rather than a
facilitative approach. Such prosecutions place the mother and the fetus
or newborn in conflicting positions and ignore and obscure their com-
mon needs and interests."w If the state is successful, the mother is in-
carcerated and separated from her child.157 The fear of incarceration is
likely to discourage pregnant women from seeking prenatal care."
Health care experts unanimously agree that failure to receive prenatal
care is extremely harmful to both the mother and the fetus."w There-
152. See Mother Charged, supra note 151.
153. See id.
154. See Patrick Reardon, Grand Jury Won't Indict Mother in Baby's Drug
Death, Cui. This., May 27, 1989, at 1; see also Paul A. Logli, Drugs in the Womb: The
Newest Battlefield in the War on Drugs, 9 CPiM. JusT. ETmcs 23, 24 (1990).
155. See infra notes 161-74 and accompanying text.
156. See Cheryl E. Amana, Maternal-Fetal Conflict: A Call for Humanism and Con-
sciousness in a Time of Crisis, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 351, 358-65 (1992) (dis-
cussing fetal rights in the substantive areas of probate, criminal, and tort law).
157. See id.
158. See Marcy Tench Stovall, Note, Looking for a Solution: In re Valerie D. and
State Intervention in Prenatal Drug Abuse, 25 CONN. L. REv. 1265, 1268 (inferring a
connection between maternal substance abuse statutes and maternal substance abus-
ers' refusal to seek prenatal care); see also infra notes 175-87.
159. See id. at 1267 (arguing that a facilitative approach will encourage maternal
substance abusers to seek treatment without fear of prosecution); see also infra
fore, criminal prosecution of pregnant substance abusers may cause
potential harm to the fetus by discouraging women from seeking prenatal
care. 160
1. Traditional Justifications Inapplicable
Traditional justifications for punishments, such as restraint, general
and specific deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation, do not support
the imposition of criminal liability.'' Criminal liability restrains a preg-
nant woman from continued substance abuse only if the law is enforced
quickly enough to incarcerate her while she is still pregnant. Punishment
after the fact does not prevent harm caused to a fetus by its mother's
use of drugs.
Criminal sanctions are unlikely to either generally or specifically deter
pregnant substance abusers.62 Neither incarceration, nor the knowledge
that others are incarcerated, will encourage a woman to remain sub-
stance free during future pregnancies. The American Medical Association
has stated that "it is clear that addiction is not simply the product of a
failure of individual willpower" but rather caused by complex hereditary,
environmental, and social factors."6 As the National Association for
Perinatal Addiction Research and Education (NAPARE) points out:
"These women are addicts who become pregnant, not pregnant women
who decide to use drugs .... ,' ' Their substance abuse is best ad-
dressed through treatment, not punishment."
Retribution is perhaps the least persuasive reason to impose criminal
liability on pregnant substance abusers. Although the goal of many state
sentencing plans is retribution," punishing pregnant substance abusers
who lack mental culpability fails to further this aim.'67 Proponents of
criminalizing maternal substance abuse assert that they are not seeking
notes 179-81.
160. See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text
161. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 65, § 1.5.
162. See itfra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
163. Cole, supra note 12, at 2667 (quoting Drug Abuse in the United States; a Poli-
cy Report, in: Proceeding of the House of Delegates, 137th Annual Meeting of the
Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association; June 26-30, 1988).
164. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR PERINATAL ADDICTION RESEARCH AND EDUCATION, POLI-
CY STATEMENT No. 1, CRIMINAL[ZATION OF PRENATAL USE: PUNITIVE MEASURES WILL BE
COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE (1990).
165. See Wendy Chavkin, Drug Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy Crossroads, 80 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 483, 485 (1990).
166. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE. § 9.94A010(1) (1989).
167. The Supreme Court first recognized drug addiction as a disease in Linder v.
United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
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retribution against the women they prosecute. Their concern is "to send
a message to other pregnant drug abusers that they should seek medical
help and counseling.""8 An Illinois lawmaker expressed similar senti-
ments after a grand jury refused to indict one maternal substance abuser
by stating, "'[it] is not easy to enforce morality with some people but
people have to be made to take responsibility. Why don't these women
get help?'""6 This simplistic view does not reflect the reality of the situ-
ation. As the experiences of many of the prosecuted women demon-
strate, there is limited treatment available to them.70
Although rehabilitation often fails, it is the strongest justification for
holding pregnant substance abusers criminally liable. However, the crimi-
nal justice system is an ineffective institution for providing rehabilitative
treatment for an addict. Putting women in jail is simply not a substitute
for providing drug treatment services. Imprisoning women during their
pregnancies or shortly after giving birth causes the mother and the chil-
dren to receive less than adequate care. 7 ' Furthermore, states may be
under no duty to provide inmates with the same type of addiction treat-
ments as civilians."7 Putting women in jail where drugs are avail-
able,T' but treatment and prenatal care are not, jeopardizes the health
168. Mother Charged with Delivering Cocaine to Her Baby, Assoc. PRESS, Nov. 13,
1989, available in 1989 WL 4070303 (citing the statement of Tony Tague, prosecutor
of Kimberly Hardy).
169. McNamara, supra note 140 (quoting the statement of State Senator Richard
Kelly after a grand jury refused to indict Melanie Green).
170. Jennifer Johnson, a Florida woman convicted of delivering cocaine to her chil-
dren, represents an example of the limited availability of treatment as her quest to
get treatment only served to allow prosecutors to use the paper-trail as evidence to
convict Florida v. Johnson, No. E89-890-C8A, sentencing order at 1 (Seminole Cty. Ct.
July 13, 1989). At the time of her arrest, Jennifer Johnson's home state had more
than 2,000 people waiting for treatment. See id. For a discussion of the Johnson
case, see supra text accompanying notes 137-47. Melanie Green was also prosecuted.
Eileen McNamara, Fetal Endangerment Cases on the Rise, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3,
1989, at 1. Her effort to enter the only in-patient drug treatment program failed after
she was charged with manslaughter for the death of her allegedly substance-exposed
newborn. See id. The program had a six-month waiting list. For a discussion of the
Green case, see supra text accompanying notes 151-54.
171. See Cole, supra note 12, at 2667 (commenting that while prisons have general-
ly inadequate health resources, they are "shockingly deficient" in tending to the needs
of pregnant women).
172. See, e.g., Aripa v. Department of Soc. and Health Servs., 588 P.2d 185, 187-88
(Wash. 1978) (noting that Washington's version of the Uniform Alcoholism and In-
toxication Treatment Act does not give prisoners a right to treatment).
173. "'Jail [is] no place to get away from drugs.'" Fetal Endangerment Cases In-
of pregnant women and their future children while doing little to solve
the underlying problem of addiction. 4
2. Deterring Women from Prenatal Care
Because doctors are required to report suspected child abuse, the fear
of being reported to the authorities discourages women from honestly
communicating their addictions to health care professionals who need
such information to provide appropriate medical care to both the woman
and her newborn.'75 The American Society of Addiction Medicine
(ASAM) considers criminalizing maternal substance abuse to be "inappro-
priate and counterproductive."'76 ASAM asserts that criminal prosecu-
tion of chemically dependent women results in "deterring such women
from seeking both prenatal care and chemical dependency treatment,
thereby increasing rather than preventing, harm to children and society
as a whole."'" The possibility of a mother not seeking adequate prena-
tal care, which is the most important complicating factor during pregnan-
cy, is an extremely compelling reason not to prosecute.' For many
women, the lack of adequate prenatal care is more detrimental to the
health of the developing fetus than the mother's use of drugs during
pregnancy. 79 A 1989 University of California Research team reviewed
records of more than 146,000 births between 1982 and 1986 in California
and found that babies born to parents with no health insurance--a group
whose numbers had grown forty-five percent in those same years-were
thirty percent more likely to die, be seriously ill at birth, and suffer low
birth weight." ° A similar 1985 Florida report tracing the dire effects of
crease, CHRmSTLAN Sci. MoNrroa, Oct. 10, 1989, at 8 (quoting Walter Connolly Jr., attor-
ney for the NAPARE); see Andrew H. Malcolm, Explosive Drug Use Creating New
Underworld in Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1989, at 1.
174. See Ellen Barry, Pregnant Prisoners, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S UJ. 189, 191 (1989)
(commenting on the insufficient standard of care in the treatment of pregnant
prisoners); see also Ellen Barry, Pregnant, Addicted and Sentenced: Debunking the
Myths of Medical Treatment in Prison, 5 J. CRIM. JUST., Winter 1977, at 22.
175. See Police Seek Doctors' Help on Fetus Abuse, TAMPA TRIB., July 18,, 1996, at
9.
176. See American Society of Addiction Medicine statement in support of Jennifer
Johnson, reprinted in Vol. 4, No. 13 Manisses Communications Group, Alcoholism &
Drug Abuse Week (March 25, 1992) [hereinafter ASAM statement].
177. See id.
178. See S.N. MacGregor, Cocaine Use During Pregnancy: Correlation Between Pre-
natal Care and Perinatal Outcome, 74 OBSTETRics & GYNECOLOGY 882 (1989).
179. See Taxpayers Pay for Lack of Prenatal Treatment, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Nov. 3, 1986, at 7B.
180. See Paula Braverman et al., Adverse Outcomes and Lack of Health Insurance
Among Newborns in an Eight-County Area of California, 1982 to 1986, 321 NEW
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the lack of prenatal care concluded that "[i]n the end, it is safer for the
baby to be born to a drug abusing, anemic, or diabetic mother who visits
the doctor throughout her pregnancy than to be born to a normal woman
who does not."l"'
Leading public health organizations, including the American Medical
Association and the American Public Health Association, oppose the
prosecution of pregnant women who use drugs."l These groups recog-
nize that this approach undermines maternal and fetal health because the
threat of criminal charges and the fear of losing their children deter
women from seeking prenatal care and drug treatment."s Government
and private researchers conclude that punitive approaches frighten wom-
en away from needed care."M One federal report found that "[w]omen
are reluctant to seek treatment if there is a possibility of punishment,"
civil or criminal, noting that "some women are now delivering their in-
fants at home in order to prevent the state from discouraging their drug
use.""M Many groups that are primarily concerned with the health and
ENG. J. MED. 508, 508-13 (1989).
181. FALUDI, supra note 77, at 428.
182. See Chasnoff et al., supra note 12, at 2667 (stating that pregnant women will
likely avoid seeking prenatal or other medical care for fear that their physician's
knowledge of their substance abuse or other potentially harmful behavior could result
in a jail sentence rather than proper medical treatment); AMERICAN PuBuc HEALTH
ASSOCIATION, POLICY STATEMENT No. 9020, ILLICIT DRUG USE BY PREGNANT WOMEN,
reprinted in 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 253 (1991) (recommending that no punitive mea-
sures be taken against pregnant women who are users of illicit drugs when no other
illegal acts, including drug-related offenses, have been committed).
183. See ASAM STATEMENT, supra note 176 (arguing that the criminal prosecution of
chemically dependent women will have the overall result of deterring such women
from seeking both prenatal care and drug treatment, thereby increasing rather than
preventing harm to children and to society as a whole); see also AMERICAN NURSES
ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON DRUGS AND ALCOHOL ABUSE/ADDICTIONS POSITION STATE-
MENT (Apr. 5, 1991) (opposing any legislation that focuses on the criminal punishment
of the mothers of drug-exposed infants).
184. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-91-80, ADMS BLOCK GRANT, WOM-
EN'S SET-ASIDE DOES NOT ASSURE DRUG TREATMENT FOR PREGNANT WOMEN 20 (1991)
[hereinafter WOMEN'S SET-ASIDE].
185. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-90-138, DRuG-ExPOSED INFANTS, A
GENERATION AT RISK 37, 39 (1990). Many women treatment experts contend that "as
stigma, rejection and blame increase, drug-abusing women's feelings of guilt and
shame increase. This leads to lowered self-esteem, increased depression, immobiliza-
tion, and isolation. As societal stigma increases, willingness to enter treatment de-
creases." Karol L Kumpfer, Treatment Programs for Drug-Abusing Women, 1 FUTURE
OF CHILDREN 50, 55-56 (1991).
rights of children, such as the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Cen-
ter for the Future of Children, and the March of Dimes, also oppose
punitive approaches to substance abuse and pregnancy."s In 1990, the
American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Substance Abuse ex-
pressed the sentiments of many public health and public advocacy
groups when it stated:
The Academy believes that the most appropriate way to prevent intrauterine drug
exposure is to educate women of childbearing age about the hazards of drags to
the fetuses and to encourage drug avoidance. If this fails, effective drug treatment
programs should be made readily available to pregnant women and to women
anticipating and/or at risk for pregnancy. Punitive measures taken toward preg-
nant women, such as criminal prosecution and incarceration, have no proven
benefits for infant health .... The American Academy of Pediatrics is concerned
that such involuntary measures may discourage mothers and their infants from
receiving the very medical care and social support systems that are crucial to
their treatment'"
IV. ADDRESSING THE TRUE CRISIS: LACK OF DRUG TREATMENT
PROGRAMS
To fully understand the complexity of the problem of maternal sub-
stance abuse and the dangers of prosecuting pregnant drug users, it is
necessary to examine the barriers confronting these women. Propo-
nents of a crackdown on pregnant drug users argue that if women seek
treatment for drug habits, they can avoid prosecution."S Yet, treat-
ment for pregnant addicts is largely unavailable.
A. 'Insufficiency of Current Treatment Options for Pregnant
Addicts
With treatment opportunities limited for all drug users, pregnant drug
users face a more acute shortage of treatment facilities than any other
segment of the population." Despite the fact that drug treatment pro-
186. See Center for the Future of Children, Recommendations, 1 FUTURE OF CHIL-
DREN 8, 9 (1991) (maintaining that a woman who uses illegal drugs during pregnancy
should not be subject to special criminal prosecution on the basis of allegations that
her illegal drug use harms the fetus).
187. American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Substance Abuse, Drug-Ex-
posed Infants, 86 PEDIATRICS 639, 641 (1990).
188. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying text
189. See FALUDi, supra note 77, at 429. Pregnant addicts who seek treatment for
their addictions generally find that help is unavailable because treatment programs re-
fuse to treat pregnant women. See id. Further, the United States government focuses
less than one percent of anti-drug funding on women, resulting in pregnant addicts
receiving less than one percent of government funds. See id.
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grams tailored for women help them overcome their addiction prob-
lems, greatly improve birth outcomes, and are cost-effective, such pro-
grams are extremely rare and overburdened."9 The 1991 Federal Gen-
eral Accounting Office (GAO) Report found that the most critical barri-
er to women's treatment "is the lack of adequate treatment capacity
and appropriate services among programs that will treat pregnant wom-
en and mothers with young children. The demand for drug treatment
uniquely designed for pregnant women far exceeds the supply." 9' A
1989 study of 95% of the drug treatment programs in New York City
found that 54% refused to treat any pregnant women, 67% would not
accept pregnant women on Medicaid, and 87% refused to treat pregnant
women on Medicaid who were addicted to crack cocaine. Addition-
al surveys conducted by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA)
showed that the few programs admitting women neither offer prenatal
care, nor provide day care for the women's children." Pregnant
women face equally bleak prospects for treatment in other cities.
Despite significant evidence that long-term residential care may be
the most effective method of treatment for chronic alcohol or drug
dependent pregnant and parenting women, such services are virtually
nonexistent."H One survey of hospitals nationwide revealed that there
is no place to refer pregnant women for treatment in two-thirds of the
hospitals.'95 Although a hospital in Boston, Massachusetts reported
over three hundred women having babies at the facility used cocaine,
the city of Boston possessed approximately thirty residential treatment
slots available for pregnant cocaine addicts.'" There are sixty women
190. See CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, PRODUCING RESULTS: A REPORT TO THE NATION 5-15 (1995) (finding
that drug treatment costs significantly less than imprisonment and reduces costs asso-
ciated with medical care and welfare).
191. WOMEN'S SET-ASIDE, supra note 184, at 4. "One 1990 survey estimates that
less than 14 percent of the 4 million women needing drug treatment received such
treatment." Id. at 1.
192. See Chavkin, supra note 165, at 485. Chavkin surveyed 78 programs, 95% of
the total available in New York City. See id. In late 1989, the A.C.LU. filed a lawsuit
on behalf of New York women unable to find drug treatment. See Elaine W. v. Joint
Diseases N. Gen. Hosp., Inc., 580 N.Y.S.2d 246, 247 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), rev'd 613
N.E.2d 523 (N.Y. 1993).
193.- See Chavkin, supra note 165, at 485.
194. See Kumpfer, supra note 185, at 53.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 54.
waiting for six beds in one California residential program.'97 Although
San Francisco had 700 drug-exposed babies in 1989, it began to develop
its first residential treatment center for pregnant women only late that
year, and the center will accommodate only fifteen women at a
time." A recent United States General Accounting Office Report sug-
gests that physicians frequently ignore substance abuse symptoms in
pregnant women or make referrals to treatment.'
B. Inadequacy of Current Treatment Programs for Women
Because drug treatment centers routinely deny pregnant women ac-
cess to treatment, only a small number of addicted women ever enter a
drug treatment program.2" Pregnant addicts seeking drug treatment
either face great difficulty in obtaining help or are unable to receive
treatment at all.20' There are two reasons commonly given in ex-
plaining why substance abuse treatment programs refuse to treat preg-
nant addicts.2 2 First, drug treatment programs have a long history of
insensitivity to pregnant women.2' Treatment programs for alcoholism
and drug addiction are largely male oriented.' Treatment centers use
techniques that were developed to help confront common problems
among men with "'little attention ... paid to specific women's treat-
ment issues, including the different emotional, social, and economic
realities of women's lives.'" 2 5 As a result, a pregnant addict receiving
197. See Missing Links: Coordinating Federal Drug Policy for Women, ltfants, and
Children: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 101st Cong. 18-19
(1989) (testimony of Minnie Thomas, Director of Mandella House).
198. See Diane Allers, Women and Crack, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1, 1989, at 4 (stating
that while women account for about one-half of all crack addicts, they comprise less
than one-third of those entering publicly funded treatment programs).
199. See WOMEN'S SET-ASmE, supra note 184, at 4-5.
200. See FALUDi, supra note 77, at 428.
201. See McNulty, supra note 44, at 301 n.167 (1988) (noting the widespread health
industry practice of denying pregnant substance abusers admission to drug treatment
centers).
202. See Wendy Chavkin et al., Drug Abuse and Pregnancy: Some Questions on
Public Policy, Clinical Management, and Maternal and Fetal Rights, 18 BImRT 107
(1991).
203. See id.
204. See id. at 111. Male-oriented rehabilitation programs only address the addiction
itself. See Michelle D. Wilkins, Comment, Solving the Problem of Prenatal Substance
Abuse: An Analysis of Punitive and Rehabilitative Approaches, 39 EMoRY LJ. 1401,
1436 n.194 (1990) (arguing that male focused treatment does not address women's
concerns such as prenatal care, parental training, and job skills).
205. Kumpfer, supra note 185, at 55 (quoting N. Finkelstein, Treatment Issues:
Women and Substance Abuse (Sept 1990) (unpublished paper presented at the OSAP
Conference, Healthy Women, Healthy Pregnancies, Healthy Infants: Emerging Solutions
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treatment designed for a male has a much more difficult time in over-
coming her addiction.2' Unless drug treatment programs develop a
more appropriate standard for women, pregnant addicts are not likely
to break their addictions. 7
The second reason drug treatment programs often refuse to treat
pregnant women is because treatment centers fear that either substance
abuse treatment or the withdrawal symptoms associated with the treat-
ment will harm the fetus and expose the centers to litigation.' This
fear stems from the uncertainty regarding the most effective medical
method to treat pregnant drug users." The list of concerns offered by
treatment centers as justifications for excluding pregnant women in-
cludes: "detoxification during pregnancy, lack of prenatal care, lack of
facilities for the infant when born if the woman is in a long-term res-
idential program, and their inability to become a licensed child care
facility or nursery."" ° Additionally, although the use of methadone for
detoxification or maintenance during pregnancy is fraught with contro-
versy,2"' there is a lack of extensive evaluation on the effects of alter-
native treatments such as psychotherapy, acupuncture, and other medi-
cations on pregnant women."'
in the Face of Alcohol and Other Drug Problems)).
206. See Chavkin et al., supra note 202, at 111.
207. See id.
208. See Wilkins, supra note 204, at 1437.
209. See Chavkin et al., supra note 202, at 107.
210. Kumpfer, supra note 185, at 54-55 (admitting that there are formidable barriers
discouraging treatment programs from meeting the needs of maternal substance abus-
ers).
211. See Chavkin et al., supra note 202, at 107; see also Chavkin, supra note 165,
at 485 (stating that crack cocaine addiction is not amenable to therapy with metha-
done). For further discussion of the effects of withdrawal on a fetus, see George
Blinick et al., Methadone Assays in Pregnant Women and Progeny, 121 Am. J. OB-
STETRICS GYNECOLOGY 617 (1975); Stephen R. Kandall et al., Differential Effects of
Maternal Heroin and Methadone Use on Birthweight, 58 PEDIATRIcS 681 (1976); B.K
Rajegowda et al., Methadone Withdrawal in Newborn Infants, 81 J. PEDIATRICS 532
(1972).
212. See Chavkin et al., supra note 202, at 107. For an interesting commentary on
treating crack cocaine addiction with acupuncture, see Benedict Carey, Cracking
Crack With Acupuncture, IN HEALTH, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 16.
C. Child Care Issues
Drug addiction afflicts women from all socio-economic backgrounds,
including many single parents with little education or income.21 Few
drug treatment centers can accommodate children. A drug treatment
program that does not provide child care services "effectively precludes
the participation of women in drug treatment."214 Statistics indicate
that most pregnant addicts potentially affected by criminal sanctions
already have children."5 Because rehabilitation and treatment centers
were originally male-centered, they do not provide child care flacilities
for women who seek treatment for drug addiction but who do not have
anyone to care for their family during the treatment.2 ' Accordingly,
because these programs do not meet the needs of the growing number
of drug-dependent women who are pregnant or who have families, the
only option available to many of these women is placing their children
in foster care or foregoing treatment. 7 When faced with this choice it
is not surprising that most women choose the latter."' To accommo-
date the needs of pregnant women with other children, treatment facili-
ties need to offer child care services within the treatment centers. A
1986 study of treatment programs found that the main reason why drug
addicted women failed to seek available treatment is the lack of child
care." 9 Another study calls child care services "the linchpin without
which treatment participation is impossible."220
V. CONCLUSION
There is little argument that society has a legitimate and compelling
interest in ensuring that children are born healthy." Children physi-
213. See McNulty, supra note 44, at 300-01 (identifying women substance abusers).
214. Wendy Chavkin, Editorial, Help, Don't Jail, Addicted Mothers, N.Y. tiMES, July
18, 1989, at A21.
215. See Gittler et al., Prenatal Substance Abuse, 19 CHILDREN ToDAY 3, 4 (1990).
The demographic characteristics of mothers who use drugs during pregnancy indicate
the women are in their twenties and thirties and are not first-time mothers. See id.
216. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
217. See McNulty, supra note 44, at 301 (explaining why pregnant addicts lack ac-
cess to prenatal care).
218. See id.
219. See Jones, supra note 11, at 1177 (citing Michele L Norris, Cries in Dark
Often Go Unanswered, WASH. POsT, July 2, 1991, at Al (referring to a National Asso-
ciation of Junior Leagues study conducted in thirty-four cities nationwide)).
220. Michael deCourcy Hinds, The Instincts of Parenthood Become Part of Crack's
ToU, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1990, at AS (quoting Dr. Elizabeth Rahdert, a clinical re-
search psychologist at the National Institute on Drug Abuse).
221. See, e.g., supra note 7.
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cally and mentally damaged by prenatal substance abuse will require
additional state services to meet their special medical, emotional, and
educational needs.2  Prosecuting the mother, however, fails to protect
fetuses from harm.
There is compelling evidence that the threat of criminal sanctions
against the mother is the least effective means of ensuring fetal health
and preventing the birth of drug addicted newborns.' Reports show-
ing a decrease in the number of newborns born addicted to drugs are
rare, but the positive results discovered are linked to non-punitive ap-
proaches rather than punitive ones.' The punitive approach of the
criminal justice system is ill-suited to intervene in the complex medical
and sociological problems associated with drug use and pregnancy
which may be more effectively and humanely addressed by drug treat-
ment programs for pregnant addicts. 5
Women's and children's advocates agree that women should engage
in behaviors that promote the birth of healthy children. Nevertheless,
the advocates recognize that women's substance abuse involves a
complex set of problems that traditional drug treatment models do not
contemplate.22 A comprehensive system of education and treatment is
needed to ensure that pregnant women receive a range of desperately
needed services.2' The primary services the system must provide are
222. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text
223. See supra notes 175-87 and accompanying text
224. For a discussion of three successful maternal substance abuse treatment pro-
grams, see Victoria J. Swenson & Cheryl Crabbe, Pregnant Substance Abusers: A
Problem That Won't Go Away, 25 ST. MARY'S LJ. 623, 668-72 (1994) (noting that "a
comprehensive program should seek to treat more than just the drug addiction of the
pregnant woman").
225. See supra notes 155-74 and accompanying text; see also CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE
ABUSE TREATMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DHHS PUB. No.
(SMA) 93-1998, PREGNANT, SuBsTANcE-ABUSING WOMEN 19 (1993) [hereinafter PREGNANT
SUBSTANCE-ABUSING WOMEN] (stating that there is no evidence that punitive approach-
es work).
226. For example, a pregnant woman addicted to heroin faces a catch-22 situation
because if she stops "cold turkey," as some advocates urge, the resulting withdrawal
can cause fetal death, and if she continues to use heroin or switches to methadone,
the child will still undergo withdrawal after birth. See PREGNANT SUBSTANCE ABUSING
WOMEN, supra note 225.
227. See Gittler et al., supra note 215, at 7. For further discussion of the need for
a comprehensive program to help pregnant addicts, see Chavkin et al., supra note
202, at 108; Veronica D. Feeg Solving Health Problems With 7reatment, Not Jail, 18
PEDIATRIC NURSING 8 (1992); Lori A. Leu, Report, A Proposal to Strengthen State Mea-
education on the prevention of drug abuse and treatment that Ibcuses
specifically on women of child bearing age and pregnant women.'
These early intervention and education services must be made highly
accessible, especially in or near the communities that have been the
hardest hit by crack cocaine.' Treatment programs also need to offer
drug treatment, medical services, and parenting training as components
of one comprehensive program.23 Furthermore, drug treatment pro-
grams must be prohibited from discriminating against pregnant
women."' It seems a grave injustice to punish a pregnant addict when
she cannot receive the treatment she needs to help conquer her addic-
tion.
Those who support the prosecution of women who use drugs during
pregnancy often justify this approach as a way of compelling drug users
to get treatment, but criminalization misses the central problem of pre-
venting fetal harm.2 2 Punitive approaches fail to resolve addiction
problems and ultimately undermine the health and well-being of women
and their children.
Perhaps most importantly, criminal prosecution and the use of child
protection laws against drug-addicted mothers are deficient solutions
because state involvement occurs only after birth and cannot achieve
the goal of ensuring healthy babies.' Rehabilitation must come dur-
ing or prior to pregnancy in order to benefit the children of drug ad-
dicted women.' It may be argued that the lack of drug treatment, the
deterrent effects of prosecution, and the harmful consequences of send-
ing women to jail all weigh heavily against choosing prosecution as the
solution to this problem if the goal is to get pregnant addicts into treat-
ment. Punitive approaches to the problem of substance abuse during
pregnancy threaten the health of women and children and seriously
erode women's rights to privacy.2'
sures for the Reduction of Infant Mortality, 23 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 559, 562-64 (1986).
228. See Gittler et al., supra note 215, at 5.
229. See id. at 5-6.
230. See Chavldn et al., supra note 202, at 107-08, 111.
231. See Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ.
278, 298 (1990).
232. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG DEPENDENCE, POLICY
STATEMENT, HIGH RISK PREGNANCIES/SUBSTANCE ABUSE (Oct 1990) (stating that a puni-
tive approach is fundamentally unfair to women suffering from addictive diseases and
serves to drive them away from seeking both prenatal care and treatment for their
drug addiction).
233. See Stovall, supra note 158, at 1298-99.
234. See id. at 1266.
235. See supra notes 85-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of privacy
rights issues.
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There are alternatives to the criminalization of maternal substance
abuse that avoid creating negative conceptions of women and avoid
infringing on maternal privacy rights. These alternatives include gov-
ernment expansion of educational efforts aimed at pregnant women and
promotions of the availability and quality of comprehensive prenatal
care.' With the goal of promoting the birth of healthy children, the
appropriate response to maternal substance abuse is to focus on educa-
tion, early intervention, and rehabilitation, not retribution.
CAROL JEAN SOVINSKI
236. See Leu, supra note 227, at 560-61 (proposing a federally and state funded sys-
tem of prenatal care as a means of lowering the infant mortality rate).

